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I. INTRODUCTION
Washington’s Growth Management Act (GMA) and Shoreline Management Act (SMA) require cities and counties to adopt and regularly update regulations that protect against further degradation of the natural environment resulting from development.1 Although neither statute requires
any one method for achieving that directive, most jurisdictions carry out
1
See Wash. Rev Code § 36.70A.030(5) (defining critical areas); Wash. Rev. Code §
36.70A.060(2) (requiring each county and city planning under the GMA to adopt development regulations that protect critical areas); Wash. Rev Code § 36.70A.172(1) (requiring designation and protection of critical areas to include best available science); Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.020 (requiring
local governments to manage shorelines with an emphasis on the preservation of “fragile” shoreline,
“natural resources,” “the land and its vegetation and wildlife,” “the waters and their aquatic life,”
“ecology,” and “environment,” among other goals). See generally Richard L. Settle, The Growth Management Revolution in Washington: Past, Present, and Future, 16 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 867 (1993)
(giving a history of the GMA and detailed discussion of the Act’s various requirements); Eric S.
Laschever, An Overview of Washington’s Growth Management Act, 7 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y J. 657
(1998); Alan D. Copsey, Including Best Available Science in the Designation and Protection of Critical Areas Under the Growth Management Act, 23 Seattle U. L. Rev. 97 (1999); Geoffrey Crooks, The
Washington Shoreline Management Act of 1971, 49 Wash. L. Rev. 423, 423-24 (1974) (giving a history of the SMA).

2018]

Are Critical Area Buffers Unconstitutional?

3

this mandate by requiring that owners of property adjacent to sensitive areas, like streams or shorelines, dedicate a “critical area buffer” as a mandatory condition on any new permit approval.2 Despite the ubiquity of critical area buffer provisions, a government demand that a landowner dedicate a strip of private property as a conservation area must still comply
with the Takings Clauses of the U.S. and Washington Constitutions.3
Typically, a land-use permit condition demanding that a landowner
dedicate his or her property to the public’s benefit must satisfy the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions as set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission4 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.5 Together, those cases established the “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests, which hold that the government may only require a landowner to dedicate property where the dedication is necessary to mitigate
the negative impacts of the proposed development on the public.6 A condition that satisfies the nexus and proportionality requirements is considered a proper exercise of the government’s land-use authority.7 However,
a condition indirectly takes property when it demands property in excess
of what is necessary to mitigate adverse impacts of a proposed development.8 Thus, the permit condition violates the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions.9
The U.S. Supreme Court has readily applied this doctrine to conditions demanding the dedication of stream and wetland buffers.10 Washington’s appellate courts, however, are split on whether the heightened scrutiny demanded by Nollan and Dolan apply to the same type of buffer conditions. In early decisions, Washington closely followed Nollan and Dolan, holding that generally applicable land use regulations that demand that

2
A “critical area buffer” is a strip of land contiguous to a sensitive area that is vegetated with
native trees and shrubs and where no land use activities are allowed. Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty.
v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd.,161 Wash.2d 415, 430-31 (2007); see also Thomas Hurby,
Update on Wetland Buffers: State of the Science, Publication Number 13-06-011, Wash. Dep’t of
Ecology (2013).
3
Wash. Const. art. I, § 16; U.S. Const. amend. V.
4
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
5
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
6
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594-95, 186 L. Ed. 2d 697
(2013); see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (“[G]overnment may not require a person to give up the
constitutional right . . . to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit [that] has little or no relationship to the property”).
7
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594-95.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
In Dolan, the Court invalidated the government’s demand that a landowner dedicate a stream
buffer. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 393-94. And in Koontz, the Court held a fee imposed in lieu of a conservation easement was subject to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592.
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owners dedicate a buffer as a condition of permit approval must satisfy the
nexus and proportionality tests.11
But in recent decisions, the courts of appeals has held laws imposing
critical area buffer conditions exempt from the nexus and proportionality
tests.12 Those cases hold that a buffer dedication automatically satisfies the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions if the city or county relied on science to show that the demanded dedication may provide environmental
benefits to the public.13 Despite this deep and irreconcilable split of authority, Washington’s Supreme Court has declined review in each and
every case involving an unconstitutional conditions challenge to a critical
area buffer.14 As it stands today, Washington’s body of unconstitutional
conditions case law is comprised of incoherent and contradictory appellate
decisions, many of which are in direct conflict with the very federal precedents they purport to apply.15
The conclusion that buffers should not be subject to heightened scrutiny is predicated on two arguments, neither of which has any merit under
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Most commonly, buffer proponents claim that Nollan and Dolan only apply in the limited context of
11
See Kitsap All. of Prop. Owners v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd. (KAPO),
160 Wash.App 250, 273, 255 P.3d 696 (2011) (Holding that a critical area buffer imposed as a mandatory condition on a development permit “must comply with the nexus and rough proportionality
tests.”); Honesty in Envtl. Analysis Legislation v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd.
(HEAL), 96 Wash.App 522, 533, 979 P.2d 864 (1999) (Critical area buffers “must comply with nexus
and rough proportionality limits the United States Supreme Court has placed on governmental authority to impose conditions on development applications.”); see also Citizens’ All. for Prop. Rights v.
Sims, 145 Wash.App 649, 661, 187 P.3d 786 (2008) (Applying Nollan and Dolan through a state
statute, the court held that a code provision that prohibited rural property owners from clearing vegetation retention areas as a condition of permit approval constituted a dedication and was subject to
nexus and proportionality requirements).
12
See, e.g., KAPO, 160 Wash.App at 273-74.
13
Id.
14
See Common Sense All. v. San Juan Cty., 184 Wash. 2d 1038, 380 P.3d 406 (2016); Olympic
Stewardship Found. v. W. Washington Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 174 Wash. 2d 1007, 278 P.3d
1112 (2012) (denying review); Kitsap All. of Prop. Owners v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 171 Wash. 2d 1030, 257 P.3d 662 (2011) (denying review); Citizens' All. for Prop. Rights v.
Sims, 165 Wash. 2d 1030, 203 P.3d 378 (2009) (denying review).
15
It is no secret that Washington’s regulatory takings law is in dire need of comprehensive reform. For years, legal scholars from both the public and private sectors have repeatedly noted that state
takings law is “mired in a cumbersome, confusing, and constitutionally suspect takings analysis.”
Roger D. Wynne, The Path Out of Washington’s Takings Quagmire: The Case for Adopting the Federal Takings Analysis, 86 Wash. L. Rev. 125, 128 (2011); see also P. Dayton and L. Clark, Lingle
Lingering: Seven Years after the United States Supreme Court's Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., Washington Courts Have Not Reformed the State's Regulatory Takings Test, 39 Envtl. & Land Use Law
(WSBA, May 2012); see also John M. Groen & Richard M. Stephens, Takings Law, Lucas, and the
Growth Management Act, 16 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 1259, 1293 (1993); Jill M. Teutsch, Comment,
Taking Issue with Takings: Has the Washington State Supreme Court Gone Too Far?, 66 Wash. L.
Rev. 545 (1991); Richard L. Settle, Regulatory Taking Doctrine in Washington: Now You See It, Now
You Don't, 12 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 339 (1989).
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an adjudicative permit condition—conditions mandated by an act of general legislation, such as critical areas ordinances that impose buffer conditions on all properties in a predetermined and preset manner, should be
exempt from heightened scrutiny.16 That argument, however, is readily
dismissed by looking to the historical development and application of the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions—there is simply no basis in the
doctrine itself for distinguishing between the particular branch of government that is making the unconstitutional demand.
In the alternative, buffer proponents argue that a government demand
that landowners set aside a portion of his or her land as a conservation area
does not take a protected interest in real property.17 Therefore, they argue
that, even if Nollan and Dolan apply to legislatively mandated conditions,
a buffer condition does not implicate any of the protections guaranteed by
the Takings Clause and is not subject to the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions.18 That argument, however, fails to acknowledge a large body
of case law recognizing that a law demanding that private property be preserved as a conservation area forces that land into public environmental
use and must comply with the Takings Clause.
This article will consider the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
with particular regard to the doctrine’s applicability to buffer conditions
imposed pursuant to acts of general legislation. Part II provides an overview and analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s unconstitutional conditions
case law. Part III discusses the state of Washington’s unconstitutional conditions case law. Part IV argues that a critical area buffer on private property constitutes a valuable and protected property right. Part V asks
whether the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc.,19 and Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist.,20 compels changes
to Washington’s case law. In light of those cases, the article considers
whether there is any meaningful purpose for distinguishing so-called “legislative” exactions from those conditions that are imposed as part of an
adjudicative procedure under the Takings Clause. Part V concludes that
there is no special environmental exception to the law of takings. Public
burdens, including the cost of environmental regulation, may not be placed
on an individual property owner. Instead, such burdens must be borne by
the public as a whole, as the framers of the Constitution intended.21

16

See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Eustis, Square Pegs in Round Holes: The Washington Courts' Misapplication of Federal Regulatory Takings Law, 4 Seattle J. Envtl. L. 1, at 20-22 (2014).
17
Id. at 22.
18
See id. at 22-24.
19
Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 542-43 (2005).
20
133 S. Ct. 2586.
21
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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II. THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS AND ITS
SPECIAL APPLICATION TO LAND-USE EXACTIONS
Over the years, the Washington Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court interpreting the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution “set[] a minimum floor of protection, below
which state law may not go.”22 Thus, although the State’s high court has
yet to explicitly recognize the doctrine’s application to property rights,23
the most appropriate starting point for this analysis is the U.S. Supreme
Court’s unconstitutional conditions case law.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions finds its roots in a series
of mid-Nineteenth century cases responding to a wave of protectionist
state laws that had placed unconstitutional conditions—such as a waiver
of the right to remove lawsuits to federal court—on foreign companies
seeking permission to do business in the state.24 As originally expressed
by the U.S. Supreme Court, the doctrine was structural in nature, strictly
enforcing an outer limit on government authority to demand that citizens
waive a constitutionally protected right in exchange for a government benefit. The doctrine recognizes that, on the one hand, the sovereign generally
enjoys broad power to attach conditions to its provision of a gratuity or
bounty to an individual.25 On the other hand, that authority ends when the
government conditions the provision of a discretionary benefit upon a requirement that a person waive or surrender up a constitutionally protected
right.26 In other words, the doctrine holds that the government may not do
indirectly that which it could not constitutionally accomplish directly:
“[T]he power of the state […] is not unlimited; and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require relinquishment of constitutional rights. […] It is inconceivable that guarantees
embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.27
22

Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 652, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987).
Eustis, Square Pegs, 4 Seattle J. Envtl. L. at 17, n.90 (noting that the Washington Supreme
Court has yet to recognize the unconstitutional conditions doctrine outside the context of criminal
sentencing).
24
See, e.g., Lafayette Ins. Co v. French, 59 U.S., 404, 407 (1855) (“This consent [to do business
as a foreign corporation] may be accompanied by such condition as Ohio may think fit to impose; …
provided they are not repugnant to the constitution of laws of the United States.”); see also Doyle v.
Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 543 (1876) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“Though a State may have the
power, if it sees fit to subject its citizens to the inconvenience, of prohibiting all foreign corporations
from transacting business within its jurisdiction, it has no power to impose unconstitutional conditions
upon their doing so”).
25
Ivanhoe Irrigation Distr. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-95 (1958).
26
Id. at 295.
27
Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926); see also Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining with the State 5 (1993) (The doctrine holds that even if the government has
23
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Importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court did not couple the doctrine to
any single clause of the constitution.28 Over the years, the Court invoked
the doctrine in defense of rights secured by the Free Speech and Freedom
of Religion Clauses,29 the Commerce and Due Process Clauses,30 among
others.31
The unique nature of land-use permitting compelled the U.S. Supreme Court to devise a “special application of the ‘doctrine of unconstitutional conditions’”32 that is designed to protect a landowner’s rights in
property33 while at the same time recognizing the government’s authority
to plan for appropriate community development.34 In lieu of the strict scrutiny typically applied in an unconstitutional conditions case, the Court in
Nollan and Dolan devised the “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests to define the limited circumstances in which the government may
lawfully condition permit approval upon the dedication of a property interest to the public: (1) the government may require a landowner to dedicate property to a public use only where the dedication is necessary to mitigate for the negative impacts of the proposed development on the public;
and (2) the government may not use the permit process to coerce landowners into giving property to the public that the government would otherwise
have to pay for.35
absolute discretion to grant or deny any individual a privilege or benefit—such as a land-use permit,
“it cannot grant the privilege subject to conditions that improperly ‘coerce,’ ‘pressure,’ or ‘induce’ the
waiver of that person’s constitutional rights.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions,
102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413 (1989); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1595 (1960).
28
James Burling & Graham Owen, The Implications of Lingle on Inclusionary Zoning and other
Legislative and Monetary Exactions, 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 397, 407 (2009) (The unconstitutional conditions doctrine has been invoked in a wide range of cases in which “government has traded with
people for their right to free speech, their right to freedom of religion, their right to be free from
unreasonable searches, their right to equal protection, and their right to due process of law”).
29
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958).
30
Hanover Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494, 514-15 (1926); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216
U.S. 1, 34-48 (1910).
31
See James S. Burling & Graham Owen, The Implications of Lingle on Inclusionary Zoning
and other Legislative and Monetary Exactions, 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 397, 407 (2009).
32
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 530. Indeed, outside the context of permit applications, conditions demanding the surrender of private property are subject to strict scrutiny. “For example, a state may not say
to a foreign corporation, you may do business within our borders if you permit your property to be
taken without the due process of law[.]” Baltic Min. Co. v. Mass., 231 U.S. 68 (1913).
33
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833 (“[T]he right to build on one’s own property—even though its exercise
can be subjected to legitimate permitting requirements —cannot remotely be described as a ‘governmental benefit’”).
34
See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926).
35
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594-96. The heightened scrutiny demanded by Nollan and Dolan is
essential because landowners “are especially vulnerable to the type of coercion that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits because the government often has broad discretion to deny a permit
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A. The Nexus and Proportionality Tests Protect Against Abuse of
the Permit System by Requiring that Exactions be Sufficiently Related to
the Burdened Development to Justify the Property Demand
A brief overview of the U.S. Supreme Court’s exactions cases illustrates how the nexus and proportionality tests are intended to work. In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission, acting pursuant to the requirements of state law, required the Nollans to dedicate an easement to allow
the public to cross over a strip of their private beachfront property as a
condition of obtaining a permit to rebuild their home.36 The Commission
specifically justified the condition on the grounds that “the new house
would increase blockage of the view of the ocean, thus contributing to the
development of ‘a “wall” of residential structures’ that would prevent the
public ‘psychologically . . . from realizing a stretch of coastline exists
nearby that they have every right to visit,’ ” and would “increase private
use of the shorefront.”37 The Nollans refused to accept the condition and
brought a federal takings claim against the Commission in state court, arguing that the condition was unconstitutional because it bore no connection to the impact of their proposed development.38
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, holding that the easement condition
violated the Takings Clause because it lacked an “essential nexus” to the
alleged public impacts that the Nollans’ project caused.39 Because the Nollans’ home would have no impact on public beach access, the Commission
could not justify a permit condition requiring them to dedicate an easement
over their property.40 Without a constitutionally sufficient connection between a permit condition and a project’s alleged impact, the easement condition was “not a valid regulation of land use but an ‘out-and-out plan of
extortion.’ ”41
The Court defined how close a “fit” is required between a permit condition and the alleged impact of a proposed land use several years later in
Dolan. There, the City conditioned Florence Dolan’s permit to expand her
plumbing and electrical supply store upon a requirement that she dedicate
some of her land as a stream buffer and a bicycle path.42 Dolan refused to
that is worth far more than property it would like to take.” see also id. at 2596 (“Extortionate demands
for property in the land-use permitting context run afoul of the Takings Clause not because they take
property but because they impermissibly burden the right not to have property taken without just compensation.”).
36
483 U.S. at 827-28.
37
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828-29 (quoting Commission).
38
Id. at 828.
39
Id. at 837.
40
Id. at 838-39.
41
Id. at 837 (citations omitted).
42
512 U.S. at 377.
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comply with the conditions and sued the City in state court, alleging that
the development conditions effected an unlawful taking and should be enjoined.43 The U.S. Supreme Court initially concluded that the City established a nexus between both conditions and Dolan’s proposed expansion,
but nevertheless held that the conditions were unconstitutional.44 Even
when a nexus exists, the Court explained, there still must be a “degree of
connection between the exactions and the projected impact of the proposed
development.”45 There must be rough proportionality—i.e., “some sort of
individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”46 The Dolan Court held that the City had not demonstrated that the permit conditions were roughly proportional to the impact of Dolan’s expansion, and
therefore concluded that the conditions violated the Constitution and were
void.47
Importantly, both Nollan and Dolan involved demands for land that
the government had targeted for acquisition and public use before the owners submitted their land-use applications and without regard to the actual
impacts of the development proposal.48 The Court determined that heightened scrutiny was especially necessary to distinguish a superficial relationship from one that warrants a compelled and uncompensated dedication of land, and to safeguard against extortionate permit conditions.49
B. The U.S. Supreme Court Distinguishes the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine from General Regulatory Takings Claims
Critical to understanding the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
is the fact that, while Nollan and Dolan are predicated on a violation of the
Takings Clause, the doctrine is distinct from a regulatory takings test. In
the decades following Nollan and Dolan, there was substantial confusion
about how and where the nexus and proportionality tests applied. This confusion was exacerbated by two factors. First, although the doctrine has a
lengthy pedigree with the U.S. Supreme Court, it remained relatively obscure.50 And second, the decisions in Nollan and Dolan had originally
43

Id. at 382.
Id. at 394-95.
45
Id. at 386.
46
Id. at 391.
47
Id.
48
Mark W. Cordes, Legal Limits on Development Exactions: Responding to Nollan and Dolan,
15 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 513, 551 (1995).
49
Id.
50
In part, the doctrine’s obscurity was due to the fact that many of the seminal cases do not
mention the doctrine by name. See, e.g., Michael Toth, Out of Balance: Wrong Turns in Public Employee Speech Law, 10 U. Mass. L. Rev. 346, 384 (2015).
44
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adopted a third prong to the test, holding that a permit condition must also
“substantially advance” a legitimate government purpose to be valid.51 As
authority for that prong, the Court cited the now-overruled case, Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 52 which concerned a facial regulatory takings challenge
to the city’s adoption of certain zoning ordinances rather than a permit
condition.53 Thus, before the Court eventually clarified the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, many courts, including Washington’s, read Nollan and Dolan as establishing a test applicable to any land use regulation
that diminishes the value of private property.54
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed that erroneous application of the
nexus and proportionality tests in two cases decided in 1999 and 2005. In
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,55 a property owner
had submitted a series of applications for a permit to build a multi-family
residential complex on a coastal property zoned for such use.56 The city
delayed and denied every permit application for a variety of reasons, and
the landowner sued alleging two different regulatory takings theories: (1)
the reasons provided for the permit denial lacked a sufficient nexus to the
government’s stated objectives under Nollan; and (2) the permit denial deprived the property owner of all economically viable use under Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).57 The jury delivered a general verdict concluding that the government’s actions effected a
temporary regulatory takings, and awarded compensation.58
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the verdict,
concluding that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the
jury’s verdict on either regulatory takings theory.59 In doing so, however,
the Ninth Circuit posited that the evidence could have also established a
violation of Dolan’s rough proportionality test.60 The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari, in part, to determine whether the Ninth Circuit “erred in
assuming that the rough-proportionality standard of [Dolan] applied to this
case.”61 Ultimately, however, the Court unanimously affirmed the court of
appeals’ judgment on different grounds, stating that it was unnecessary to
discuss Dolan where substantial evidence had demonstrated that the city’s
51

Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385.
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
53
Id. at 260.
54
See, e.g., Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash.2d 621, 642-43, 653, 655 (1987).
55
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
56
Id. at 695-98.
57
Id. at 700-01.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 701-02 (citing Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422,
1430-34 (9th Cir. 1996)).
60
Id.
61
Id. at 702.
52
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decision to deny the permit lacked a sufficient nexus to the government’s
stated objectives.62
The Del Monte Dunes Court explained that, although the lower court
had not provided “a definitive statement of the elements of a claim for a
temporary regulatory taking” the trial court’s jury instructions were sufficiently consistent with the Supreme Court’s previous regulatory takings
decisions to establish the city’s liability.63 As a result, the Court declined
to rule on the question whether Dolan applied to a permit denial, holding
only that “it was unnecessary for the Court of Appeals to discuss rough
proportionality. That it did so is irrelevant to our disposition of the case.”64
Nonetheless, writing in dicta, the Supreme Court noted that it had “not
extended the rough-proportionality test of Dolan beyond the special context of exactions-land-use decisions conditioning approval of development
on the dedication of property to public use.”65 Although that discussion
shed some much-needed light on the doctrine’s application to permit conditions, it also resulted in more confusion that will be discussed below.
The Court revisited Nollan and Dolan several years later in Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.66 There, Chevron sued the State of Hawaii alleging
that the price cap provisions of legislation designed to lessen the oil company’s share of the state’s gasoline station market constituted a regulatory
taking.67 The trial court agreed, and granted summary judgment in favor
of Chevron, concluding under Agins that the statute failed to substantially
advance a legitimate public interest.68 On review, the U.S. Supreme Court
concluded that the “substantially advances a legitimate government interest” test was properly categorized as a due process test, not a regulatory
takings test, because it “reveal[ed] nothing about the magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon private property
rights.”69 It explained that a “test that tells us nothing about the actual burden imposed on property rights, or how that burden is allocated, cannot
62
The decision speaks to both Nollan’s nexus requirement and the now-excised requirement that
the decision substantially advance a legitimate government interest. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at
701.
63
The jury was instructed that “if the preponderance of the evidence establishes that there was
no reasonable relationship between the city’s denial of the ... proposal and legitimate public purpose,
you should find in favor of the plaintiff.” Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 701; Id. at 703 (citing Dolan,
512 U.S. at 385; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016; Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992); Nollan, 483
U.S. at 834; Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenebrictus, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987); United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985);, 447 U.S. at 260 ).
64
Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 703 (Dolan was designed to address the problem of “excessive
exactions”).
65
Id. at 702.
66
544 U.S. 528, 538-39 (2005).
67
Id. at 532-34.
68
Id. at 535-36.
69
Id. at 542.
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tell us when justice might require that the burden be spread among taxpayers through payment of compensation.”70
The Court made clear that its decision to excise the “substantially
advances” inquiry from the takings lexicon did not affect the viability of
an exactions claim brought under Nollan and Dolan.71 In reaffirming the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the Court explained that the nexus
and proportionality tests are “worlds apart from a rule that says a regulation affecting property constitutes a taking on its face solely because it
does not substantially advance a legitimate government interest.”72
Like Del Monte Dunes, however, the Court’s attempt to explain the
unique nature of a case brought under Nollan and Dolan only added to
existing confusion about the doctrine’s applicability. Many courts and
practitioners read Del Monte Dunes and Lingle as having limited the nexus
and proportionality tests to the facts of Nollan and Dolan, applying to only
those adjudicatively imposed permit conditions that require a dedication
of real property to the public.73 By the time the U.S. Supreme Court revisited the doctrine in 2013, there was a deeply entrenched and nationwide
split of authority on the question of whether Nollan and Dolan also applied
to legislatively mandated conditions or to permit conditions that demand
money (or other personal property) in lieu of a property dedication.74

70

Id. at 543.
Id. at 547-48.
72
Id. at 547-48.
73
The Supreme Courts of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, and Colorado, and the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, limit Nollan and Dolan to administratively imposed conditions. See, e.g.,
Alto Eldorado Partners v. City of Santa Fe, 634 F.3d 1170, 1179 (10th Cir. 2011); St. Clair Cnty.
Home Builders Ass’n v. City of Pell City, 61 So. 3d 992, 1007 (Ala. 2010); Spinell Homes, Inc. v.
Municipality of Anchorage, 78 P.3d 692, 702 (Alaska 2003); San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & Cty of
San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 102-04 (Cal. 2002); Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687,
696 (Colo. 2001); Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Arizona v. Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 996 (Ariz. 1997),
cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1120 (1997).
74
The Texas, Ohio, Maine, Illinois, New York, and Washington Supreme Courts and the First
Circuit Court of Appeals do not distinguish between legislatively and administratively imposed exactions, and apply the nexus and proportionality tests to generally applicable permit conditions. Town of
Flower Mound, 135 S.W.3d at 641; Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton & Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349, 355-56 (Ohio 2000); Curtis v. Town of South Thomaston, 708 A.2d 657,
660 (Maine 1998); City of Portsmouth v. Schlesinger, 57 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1995); Northern Ill.
Home Builders Ass’n, Inc. v. Cty of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 397 (Ill. 1995); Manocherian v. Lenox
Hill Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 479, 483 (N.Y. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1109 (1994); Trimen Dev. Co. v.
King Cty., 877 P.2d 187, 194 (Wash. 1994). Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit is internally conflicted on
this question. See Mead v. City of Cotati, 389 Fed. App’x 637, 639 (9th Cir. 2010) (Nollan and Dolan
do not apply to legislative conditions); Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941
F.2d 872, 874-76 (9th Cir. 1991) (adjudicating a Nollan-based claim against an ordinance requiring
developers to provide affordable housing); Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802, 813-15, 819-20
(9th Cir. 1998) (plurality opinion with the court divided equally on whether Nollan and Dolan apply
to legislative exactions).
71
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C. The U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies the Doctrine and its Applicability to Land-Use Permit Conditions in Koontz
The U.S. Supreme Court revisited the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine in its 2013 decision, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management
District.75 There, Coy Koontz, Sr., sought permission to develop a small
portion of his 14.9 acre undeveloped, commercial property located at the
intersection of two major highways in Orlando.76 The St. Johns River Water Management District (“the District”), a Florida land-use agency, had
designated his property a critical wetland and demanded that, in addition
to dedicating 11 acres of his land in a conservation easement, Mr. Koontz
pay upwards of $150,000 to improve 50 acres of state-owned property
miles away from his proposed development as a mandatory condition of
receiving his permits.77 When Mr. Koontz objected that the off-site mitigation demand was excessive, the agency denied his permits, rendering his
property unusable.78
Mr. Koontz filed a lawsuit in Florida state court, challenging the
agency’s off-site mitigation demand under Nollan and Dolan, which, if
faithfully applied, should have provided an easy solution for Mr. Koontz.
But, over the years, many lower courts had limited Nollan and Dolan to
their facts, providing ways for local land use authorities to avoid the nexus
and proportionality requirements.79 For example, instead of demanding an
interest in real property, agencies began imposing monetary obligations—
i.e., requirements that property owners pay a fee in lieu of the desired property dedication as a condition of obtaining a land-use permit.80 Because
75

133 S. Ct. 2586.
Zoned for commercial use, the property is located in an area of intense residential and commercial development adjacent to State Road 50, a major arterial, and immediately east of Florida’s
East-West Expressway (S.R. 408). A drainage ditch that channels storm water runoff from the highway
runs along the property’s western edge. And an easement for high-voltage power lines is located about
300 feet south of the highway, bisecting the lot into northern and southern segments. Koontz, 133 S.
Ct. at 2591-92.
77
Florida’s inclusion of portions of Mr. Koontz’s land in the Riparian Habitat Protection Zone
did not mean the land contained wetlands and/or riparian habitat. Instead, the designation created a
legal presumption that any use of land within the zone would be harmful to such habitat, therefore
requiring affected landowners to obtain environmental permits from the District. See Fla. Admin. Code
r. 40C-4.301(2)(a)7; Fla. Admin. Code r. 40C-4.301(1), (2); Fla. Admin. Code r. 40C-41.063(5)(d)1,
4.
78
133 S. Ct. at 2593.
79
See Richard Epstein, Introduction: The Harms and Benefits of Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. Ill. U.
L. Rev. 477, 492 (1995) (The lower courts “worked a pretty thorough nullification of Nollan, which
was dutifully confined to its particular facts”).
80
Id. (“One of the reasons for Dolan was the hostile response in the lower courts to Nollan.
Everywhere you looked the state satisfied the essential nexus test. The lower courts worked a pretty
thorough nullification of Nollan, which was dutifully confined to its particular facts.”); Steven J.
Lemon & Sandy R.Colin, The First Applications of the Nollan Nexus Test: Observations and Comments, 13 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 585, 598-600 (1989); Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 Colum. L.
76
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Nollan and Dolan involved interests in real property, and not monetary
obligations, numerous courts held that the government did not have to
demonstrate nexus and rough proportionality when exacting money or
other non-real property from land-use applicants.81 Thus, at the time Mr.
Koontz’s case was winding its way through the courts, there was a significant split of authority on whether or not the Takings Clause protects a
person’s money to the same degree that it protects a person’s land.82
The Florida trial and appellate courts concluded that the District’s
permit condition was subject to Nollan and Dolan, and found the demand
for 50 acres of off-site mitigation to be unconstitutional because it lacked
the necessary connection to any impacts of the development.83 The Florida
Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the lower court decisions, stating:
[W]e hold that under the takings clauses of the United States and
Florida Constitutions, the Nollan/Dolan rule with regard to “essential
nexus” and “rough proportionality” is applicable only where the condition/exaction sought by the government involves a dedication of or
over the owner’s interest in real property in exchange for permit approval; and only when the regulatory agency actually issues the permit sought, thereby rendering the owner’s interest in the real property
subject to the dedication imposed.84

The U.S. Supreme Court took review of the case in order to settle the
federal constitutional questions that had been addressed by the Florida
courts.85
Most of the parties’ arguments were focused on how to best characterize the nexus and rough proportionality tests amongst the Supreme
Court’s case law, and explaining how the character of the tests impacts the
parties’ substantive and procedural rights. Mr. Koontz argued that the District’s demand that he finance improvements to the government’s property

Rev. 1600, 1608 (1988) (limiting Nollan to only permit conditions involving physical invasions of
property).
81
See, e.g., West Linn Corp. Park, LLC v. City of West Linn, 428 Fed. Appx. 700 (9th Cir. 2011);
West Linn Corp. Park, LLC v. City of West Linn, 240 P.3d 29, 45 (Or. 2010); McClung v. City of
Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2008).
82
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594; see also Catherine L. Hall, Valid Regulation of Land Use or Outand-out Plan of Extortion? Commentary on St. Johns River Water Management Dist., 41 Real Est.
L.J. 270, 291 (2012) (“A survey of state and federal decisions reveals there is considerable disagreement about when the application of Nollan and Dolan apply to the exactions takings analysis. . . . The
Florida Supreme Court and other courts have issued conflicting opinions about whether impact fees
and off-site mitigation should be subject to scrutiny under this doctrine.”); Robert Meltz, Takings Law
Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 Ecology L.Q. 307, 369 (2007) (describing split in courts’ interpretation).
83
St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Distr. v. Koontz, 5 So.3d 8, 10-12 (Fla. Ct. App. 2009).
84
St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Distr. v. Koontz, 77 So.3d 1220, 1230 (Fla. 2011).
85
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594.
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as a condition of permit approval was an exaction implicating his property
rights in his money and, therefore, triggering review under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.86 The District, however, argued that because
Mr. Koontz had objected to the condition, no permit was issued and, therefore, there was no taking.87
As for the Florida Supreme Court’s conclusion that monetary exactions are not subject to the same scrutiny as demands for real property, Mr.
Koontz contended that nothing in the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
the Takings Clause, Nollan, or Dolan recognizes a relevant distinction
among the types of permit exaction subject to the nexus and rough proportionality limitations.88 Government demands for real or personal property—both categories of property protected by the Takings Clause—are
subject to the same limitations.89
Moreover, Mr. Koontz argued that application of the nexus and proportionality limitations does not depend upon when in the permit process
the exaction is imposed.90 A decision to deny a permit application based
on refusal to accede to an unlawful exaction and a decision to approve a
permit application subject to acceptance of an unlawful exaction are substantively identical. In both cases, no permit issues unless and until the
permit applicant agrees to waive his right to compensation for the confiscated property.91
The District, however, characterized Nollan and Dolan as establishing a regulatory takings test—similar to the argument rejected in Del
Monte Dunes and Lingle.92 The District then explained that a fundamental
prerequisite of a regulatory takings claim is that the government has, in
fact, taken property, either directly or through burdensome regulatory
measures.93 Because the District denied Mr. Koontz’s permit applications,
the exaction remained unfulfilled and no taking had, in fact, occurred.94
Accordingly, the District insisted that its demand, which had formed the
basis of its permit denial, cannot be subject to heightened scrutiny under
the nexus and rough proportionality standards.95
Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 33-39, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S.Ct. 2586 (2012) (No 11-1447), 2012 WL 5940280.
87
Brief for Respondent at 26-38, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133
S.Ct. 2586 (2012) (No 11-1447),.2012 WL 6694053 (U.S.).
88
Id.
89
Id. at 39-44.
90
Id. at 30-32.
91
Id.
92
Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 26-28, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S.Ct. 2586 (2012) (No 11-1447),.2012 WL 6694053.
93
Id. at 28-30.
94
Id. at 27-28.
95
Id.
86
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The Court rejected the District’s argument, reaffirming once again
that the nexus and proportionality tests of Nollan and Dolan constitute “‘a
special application’ of the [unconstitutional conditions] doctrine that protects the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation for property that the
government takes when owners apply for land-use permits.”96 The Court
explained that the nexus and proportionality tests place a limit on the government’s authority to condition approval of a land use permit upon a dedication of property to a public purpose.97 If a condition satisfies the tests,
it is constitutional; if not, it is unconstitutional.98 This principle “do[es] not
change depending on whether the government approves a permit on the
condition that the applicant turn over property or denies a permit because
the applicant refuses to do so.”99 Thus, the Court unanimously held “that
a demand for property from a land-use permit applicant must satisfy the
requirements of Nollan and Dolan even when the government denies the
permit[.]”100
The Court split 5-4 on the question whether a demand for money is
subject to Nollan and Dolan. The majority ruled that money is property;
therefore, a permit condition demanding money in lieu of a dedication of
real property must satisfy nexus and proportionality.101 The dissent, however, opined that different types of property should be provided differing
degrees of protection under the Takings Clause.102 Thus, while a demand
for real property may be properly subject to heightened scrutiny under
Nollan and Dolan, the dissent suggested that a demand for money should
be subject to less scrutiny—if any at all.103 The Court ultimately reversed
and remanded the case for the Florida state courts to enter a decision consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion and to determine whether
the District had preserved a series of factual and state-law questions for
further consideration.104
96

Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599.
Id. at 2595.
98
Id.
99
Id. (A “contrary rule would be especially untenable … because it would enable the government
to evade the limitations of Nollan and Dolan simply by phrasing its demands for property as conditions
precedent to permit approval. … and would effectively render Nollan and Dolan a dead letter”).
100
Id. at 2603; see also id. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“I think the Court gets the first question
it addresses right”).
101
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603.
102
Id.. at 2604-09 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
103
Id. at 2609 n.3.
104
Id. at 2603. On remand, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s conclusion that
the permit condition violated Nollan and Dolan. The trial court then ordered the state to compensate
Mr. Koontz for having temporarily taken his property for a period of years during which the District
had refused—despite a court order—to issue the permit without the unconstitutional condition. See St.
Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 183 So. 3d 396 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014), rev. denied __
So.2d __, 2016 WL 688284 (2016).
97
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III. WASHINGTON CASE LAW ON BUFFER CONDITIONS IS RIDDLED
WITH CONTRADICTORY AND INCOHERENT DECISIONS
Washington courts are in a state of disarray on the topic of Nollan
and Dolan. Over the years, state courts have applied the nexus and proportionality tests (1) as a direct regulatory takings theory,105 (2) as a due process theory,106 or (3) as incorporated into a state statute limiting local government authority to impose impact fees.107 Unsurprisingly, those courts
have arrived at very different conclusions about how and where the doctrine applies and whether the government must support a demand for a
critical area buffer with evidence of its necessity. Making matters worse,
the state appellate courts have split on whether a critical area buffer requirement exacts an interest in real property,108 and more generally,
whether Nollan and Dolan apply to permit conditions required by an act
of generally applicable legislation.109 Unless the state Supreme Court resolves these conflicts, landowners and the government will be forced to
plan for future development in an uncertain and unpredictable legal environment.
A. Early Washington Decisions Apply Nollan/Dolan to Permit Conditions Requiring the Dedication of a Conservation Area
The earliest Washington decisions that considered legislation requiring landowners to dedicate critical area buffers held the conditions subject
to Nollan and Dolan. In Honesty in Environmental Analysis & Legislation
v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Board (HEAL), the
court considered amendments to Seattle’s steep slope regulations, which
the City had adopted as part of its critical areas update.110 The stated purpose of the city’s development restrictions was to prevent further erosion.111 Seattle, however, failed to consider contrary scientific conclusions
contained in its legislative record, which opined that the City’s prohibition
against steep slope disturbance would not actually prevent erosion.112 The

105
Sparks v. Douglas Cty., 127 Wash.2d 901, 908 (1995); Burton v. Clark Cty, 91 Wash.App
505, 530 (1998).
106
Kitsap All. of Prop. Owners v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 160
Wash.App 250 (2011).
107
See Trimen Dev. Co. v. King Cty, 124 Wash. 2d 261 (1994); Citizens’ All. for Property Rights
v. Sims, 145 Wash.App 649 (2008); Cobb v. Snohomish Cty, 64 Wash.App 451 (1991).
108
Compare KAPO, 160 Wash.App at 272, with Common Sense All. v. Growth Mgmt Hearings
Bd, 189 Wash.App 1026, 2015 WL 4730204 at * 7-8 (2015) (unreported).
109
Id.
110
HEAL, 96 Wash.App at 535.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 529-30.
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court concluded that the identification of critical areas is a uniquely scientific inquiry that should identify the “nature and extent of [the critical areas’] susceptibility” to damage that will in fact result from use or development of the property.113 As part of its development of a critical areas ordinance, a city must show that its critical area buffers satisfy the nexus and
proportionality tests.
. . . . [The City] cannot ignore the best available science in favor of
the science it prefers simply because the latter supports the decision
it wants to make. If it does, that decision will violate either the nexus
or rough proportionality rules or both.114

Applying the nexus and proportionality standards through a state statute, Washington courts decided two crucial cases invalidating legislatively-mandated exactions of conservation areas.115 In Isla Verde International Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, a property developer sought a permit to build a 51-lot subdivision on 13.4 acres in the City of Camas.116
Pursuant to a code provision requiring all subdivisions to set aside open
space, Camas conditioned permit approval upon a requirement that Isla
Verde set aside 30 percent of its land to provide recreation and environmental benefits.117 The developer challenged the set-aside development
conditions.118
Although the court of appeals concluded that the condition violated
Nollan and Dolan,119 the Washington Supreme Court analyzed the condition on statutory grounds under the doctrine of avoidance of constitutional
issues.120 Under the statute’s nexus and proportionality requirement, the
Court held that the city bore the burden of demonstrating that a dedication
is “reasonably necessary as a direct result of the proposed development or
plat.”121 The court emphasized that nexus and proportionality require “that
development conditions must be tied to a specific, identified impact of a

113

Id. at 533.
Id. at 533-34.
115
In 1992, the Washington Supreme Court held that the nexus and proportionality tests were
codified into a state statute that limited local government’s authority to exact impact fees from permit
applicants in RCW 82.02.020, providing courts with a nonconstitutional basis upon which to evaluate
exactions. Trimen Dev. Co. v. King Cty, 124 Wash.2d 261, 274 (1994).
116
Isla Verde Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wash.2d 740, 746, 49 P.3d 867 (2002).
117
Id. at 749-50.
118
Id. at 750.
119
Isla Verde Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 99 Wash.App 127, 139-42, 990 P.2d 429,
437 (1999), as clarified on denial of reconsideration (Feb. 11, 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 146
Wash.2d 740, 49 P.3d 867 (2002).
120
Isla Verde, 146 Wash.2d at 757-58; see also San Telmo Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 108 Wash.2d
20, 24, 735 P.2d 673 (1987) (shifting general social costs onto developer is an in-kind tax).
121
Isla Verde, 146 Wash.2d at 761.
114
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development on a community.”122 Under this standard, the Court held that
a city cannot lawfully impose a preset condition applicable to “all new
development collectively.”123 Accordingly, the Court held that a set-aside
requirement cannot be “uniformly applied, in the preset amount, regardless of the specific needs created by the given development” and invalidated the condition.124
Similarly, in Citizens Alliance for Property Rights v. Sims, a citizen
group challenged King County’s adoption of a critical areas ordinance that
required rural property owners to set aside 50 to 65 percent of their land
as an environmental “resource area” in a uniform and pre-set manner as a
mandatory condition on all new development.125 Like the condition at issue in Isla Verde, King County’s ordinance did not take into consideration
whether a proposed rural development would actually cause any increased
impacts to identified critical areas, and did not take into account whether
existing regulations or other site-specific management practices could satisfactorily mitigate any impacts of development.126 As a result, the court
of appeals concluded that King County’s set-aside requirement failed to
satisfy the proportionality requirement that a condition on development
must be impact-specific.127
Between 1992 and 2008, Washington courts, for the most part, faithfully applied the nexus and proportionality tests in a manner consistent
with the U.S. Supreme Court. During this time, Isla Verde and Citizens’
Alliance marked the high point in the courts’ willingness to strictly enforce
the nexus and proportionality requirements against local governments’ use
of the permit process to exact large tracts of land for public environmental
purposes.
B. The Appellate Courts Abandon Nexus and Proportionality Tests
in Favor of a Substantially Advances Inquiry When Considering Buffer
Conditions
Over the course of three recent decisions, the court of appeals
abandoned the nexus and proportionality inquiries required by Nollan and
Dolan in favor of a rational basis test that alleviates the government of
both heightened scrutiny and the burden of proof. In so doing, the appellate
courts created significant conflicts, calling into question the doctrine’s ap-

122

Id.
Id.
124
Id. at 763.
125
Citizens’ All. for Prop. Rights v. Sims, 145 Wash.App 649, 660–61, 187 P.3d 786 (2008).
126
Id.
127
Id. at 668-69.
123
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plicability and predictability. Kitsap Alliance of Property Owners v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Bd. (KAPO),128 a case
decided shortly after Citizen’s Alliance, set the stage for the current status
of Washington state takings law. Like Isla Verde and Citizens’ Alliance,
KAPO involved a citizen lawsuit challenging the county’s adoption of an
ordinance that required all shoreline property owners to dedicate a shoreline buffer that was predetermined in size, and was imposed without regard
to any site-specific conditions.129 The court of appeals, however, reached
the opposite conclusion as the previous cases, upholding the mandatory
permit condition.130
The KAPO court applied Nollan and Dolan directly to the ordinance, correctly concluding that environmental regulations that impose
conditions on development applications, like the county’s critical areas ordinance, “must comply with the nexus and rough proportionality tests.”131
But the court then declined to apply nexus and proportionality scrutiny—
as defined by prior state and federal precedent—to the buffer condition.132
Instead, the court mistakenly characterized Nollan and Dolan as establishing a “due process” doctrine, under which a regulation is subject only to
rational basis scrutiny.133 Then, applying this lower level of scrutiny, the
court concluded that Nollan and Dolan would be satisfied if the government engaged in a “reasoned process” to determine “the necessity of protecting functions and values in the critical areas” when adopting CAO
buffers.134
In two decisions issued shortly after KAPO, the appellate courts
further entrenched the decision to replace the heightened scrutiny demanded by Nollan and Dolan with minimal scrutiny. In Olympic Stewardship Foundation v. Western Washington Growth Management Hearings
Board, the court of appeals adopted a per se rule that “any dedications of

128

160 Wash.App 250, 273, 255 P.3d 696 (2011).
Id. at 272-74.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 273.
132
Id. at 272-74.
133
Id. at 272.
134
Id. at 272-74. Of course, the fact that the government developed a scientific record only begs
the question whether there is any evidence of nexus and proportionality. The idea that a government’s
reliance on generalized science to determine how much land to put to public use should obviate the
need for Nollan and Dolan’s factual inquiry turns this Court’s regulatory takings case law on its head.
Standing alone, a determination of public need has never been sufficient to justify a government’s
decision to put private property to a public use. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416
(“[A] strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving that
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.”). Science is not a talisman
that precludes judicial scrutiny; instead, it constitutes evidence that should be considered as part of a
nexus and proportionality analysis.
129
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land within the critical areas are de facto ‘reasonably necessary as a direct
result of the proposed development or plat.’”135
The most recent appellate decision addressing exactions, Common
Sense Alliance v. Growth Management Hearings Board,136 marks the furthest retreat from the standards set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court. In
that case, a group of property owners challenged a county’s adoption of an
ordinance that required, as a mandatory condition on any new permit approval, that all shoreline property owners dedicate a significant portion of
their shorefront as a conservation area designed to filter pollutants from
stormwater before it reaches the shoreline.137 The final ordinance established buffers large enough to filter pollution caused by neighboring land
uses (including city streets and subpar drainage), doing nothing to limit
the size of the conservation areas to only that land necessary to mitigate
for pollution attributable to the effected property owner’s land use.138
Despite this clear violation of nexus and proportionality, the court of
appeals rejected CSA’s unconstitutional conditions claim on three
grounds.139 First, relying on the dicta from Del Monte Dunes, the court
held that a landowner may not challenge a legislative exaction under the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.140 Second, the court misattributed
Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion, in which she suggested that legislative
exaction be subject to lesser scrutiny than adjudicative exactions, to the
majority opinion, which was silent on the issue.141 And third, relying on
the dissenting opinion in Koontz (without indicating that the portion of the
opinion it cited was the dissent), the court held that a landowner may not
challenge a legislative exaction under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.142 Second, citing no authority, the court held that a government
demand that a property owner dedicate a conservation buffer to a public

135

Olympic Stewardship Found. v. W. Wash Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 166 Wash.App 172,
199, 274 P.3d 1040 (2012) (applying Nollan and Dolan through the state’s impact fee statute).
136
Common Sense All. v. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 189 Wash.App 1026, 2015 WL 4730204
(2015) (unpublished). The court’s analysis of Nollan and Dolan was marred by obvious errors, including the incorrect conclusion that Dolan had upheld the challenged stream buffer conditions. Id. at *6.
The court of appeals refused to correct that patent error on reconsideration, and the State Supreme
Court denied review. Common Sense All. v. San Juan Cty., 184 Wash. 2d 1038, 380 P.3d 406 (2016).
137
189 Wash.App. 1026, 2015 WL 4730204 at *1.
138
See Friends of the San Juans v. San Juan Cty, Western Washington Growth Management
Hearings Board No. 13-2-0012c, 2013 WL 5212385, at *36 (Final Decision and Oder, Sept. 6, 2013)
(remanding original buffers and directing the county to increase the buffer size to “take into account
the intensity of impacts from adjacent land uses”).
139
189 Wash.App. 1026, 2015 WL 4730204 at *3-8.
140
Id. at *7 (citing Del Monte Dunes, 526 US at 702.).
141
Id. at *7 (citing Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594-96; but see Koontz, 133 S. Ct at 2608 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting)).
142
Id.
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environmental use would not qualify as a taking if imposed directly.143
Third, relying on KAPO’s mischaracterization of Nollan and Dolan as establishing a due process test, the court held that the buffer demand satisfied
the minimal scrutiny applicable to a due process challenge.144 Specifically,
the court concluded that a local government’s reliance on a scientific opinion when developing a mandatory dedication automatically satisfies the
unconstitutional condition doctrine.145
Despite the conflict between the KAPO-rational basis line of cases
and cases relying on the heightened scrutiny standard set out by Nollan,
Dolan, Lingle, and Koontz—the Washington Supreme Court inexplicably
declined review in Citizens Alliance, KAPO, OSF, and CSA. The court’s
failure to timely address this plain conflict of law has allowed a significant
split of authority regarding the doctrine’s applicability to continue.
IV. BUFFERS EXACT A VALUABLE INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY AND
ARE PROTECTED BY THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
Until CSA, Washington courts had uniformly held that critical area
buffers exacted an interest in real property and were, therefore, subject to
Nollan and Dolan—even though the courts had been anything but consistent in their interpretation and application of the nexus and proportionality tests. CSA is an unsupported outlier that only operates to further confuse landowners and governments alike. Indeed, citing no authority, the
court ruled “[n]o interest in land will be transferred or conveyed by operation of the … ordinances” imposing buffers on new development.146 The
CSA court was simply wrong on that account and must be overturned at
the earliest opportunity.
A critical area buffer is a strip of land contiguous to a sensitive area,
such as a wetland, stream, or shoreline, that is vegetated with native trees
and shrubs and where no land use activities are allowed.147 The idea behind
imposing buffers as a regulatory control is two-fold. First, a buffer physically separates human activity from a sensitive area, leaving the area untouched.148 Second, if the vegetated area is large enough and dense
enough, a buffer can mimic a variety of natural processes that could exist
143

Id.
Id. at *5 (citing KAPO, 160 Wash.App at 273-74).
145
Id. (“Because the county had considered the best available science and employed a reasoned
process in adopting its shoreline critical areas ordinance . . . permit decisions . . . based on those
regulations would satisfy the nexus and rough proportionality tests”).
146
189 Wash.App 1026, at *8.
147
Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd.,161 Wash.2d 415,
430, 166 P.3d 1198 (2007).
148
See A.J. Castelle et al., Wetland and Stream Buffer Size Requirements – A Review, 23 J. Environ. Qual. 878, 878 (1994).
144
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if the surrounding land remained in an undisturbed state.149 Studies generally indicate that, based on a variety of site specific factors, a fully vegetated buffer can provide a variety of ecological benefits (often referred to
a “functions”), including impoundment of storm water runoff; filtration of
sediment, nutrients, and pollutants; and creation of habitat corridors. 150
Because buffers are inexpensive, easy to administrate, and generally
thought to be effective at addressing such general problems as increasing
storm water runoff due to urbanization, mandatory buffers have become
the most common tool employed by government when developing regulations intended to protect environmentally sensitive areas.151
The manner in which buffers are imposed is also important to understand when evaluating the claim that they do not exact a property interest.
In a typical case, a parcel of land that is presently used for residential purposes must file a binding site plan and notice to title that designates and
separates the buffer area from the rest of the lot, as a condition on any
permit approval.152 These filings operate to sever all development and use
rights from the buffer zone and are binding on all future owners.153 The
government retains oversight and control over the buffer zone, including
a right to enter the property to assure that the designated buffer area is only
being used in a manner that maximizes the protection of ecological values.154 The owner of the underlying estate may retain some passive use
rights, such as the right to pass over the buffer, but is generally proscribed
from any additional development or use of the property that could disturb
vegetation in the buffer.155 The purpose behind the designation of a buffer

149

Id.
The actual functions provided by a parcel of property will vary greatly based on a number of
site-specific conditions such as soil type, slope, vegetation density and type, neighboring land uses,
etc.
See, e.g., Alan Desbonnet et al., Development of Coastal Vegetated Buffer Programs, 23 Coastal
Management 91, 93-95 (1995).
151
See, e.g., Swinomish, 161 Wash.2d at 430-31.
152
See, e.g., San Juan County Code (SJCC) § 18.35.150, Table 3.6 (establishing mandatory buffers); SJCC § 18.35.100(D)-(E) (requiring that permit applicants dedicate the buffer by designating it
and recording it on a site plan or plat).
153
See also Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wash.2d 740, 758-59, 49 P.3d
867 (2002) (a code provision requiring “reservation of open space” as a condition of permit approval
is the equivalent of a dedication); Citizens’ All. for Prop. Rights v. Sims, 145 Wash.App 649, 661, 187
P.3d 786 (2008) (a code provision that prohibited rural property owners from clearing vegetation retention areas as a condition of permit approval constituted a dedication and was subject to nexus and
proportionality requirements).
154
See, e.g., City of Bainbridge Island Shoreline Master Program at § 7.2.1 (citing Bainbridge
Island Municipal Code § 1.16) (available at http://www.bainbridgewa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/5072).
155
Id. at § 4.1.3.7.
150
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zone is to provide a mechanism that will permanently protect the designated land from development and dedicate the land to the sole purpose of
providing ecological benefits to the environment.
From a real property perspective, a governmental exertion of control
over a buffer zone deprives landowners of a valuable interest in real property.156 Washington state property law expressly recognizes that a conservation buffer is a valuable interest in real property: “A development right,
easement, covenant, restriction, or other right, or any interest less than the
fee simple, to protect . . . or conserve for open space purposes . . . constitutes and is classified as real property.”157 And, under both Washington
state property law and federal constitutional law, a public dedication of a
property interest can be achieved via notice on a binding public document,
such as a site plan.158
A requirement that an owner establish and maintain a conservation
area plainly constitutes a public use of private land.159 Accordingly, the
U.S. Supreme Court has twice applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to conservation areas. In Dolan, the Court invalidated the government’s demand that a landowner dedicate a stream buffer.160 In Koontz,
the Court held that a fee imposed in lieu of a conservation easement was
subject to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.161 The Washington
courts have similarly concluded that critical area buffers must satisfy the
nexus and proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan.162

156
John M. Groen and Richard M. Stephens, Takings Law, Lucas, and the Growth Management
Act, 16 U. Puget Sound L. Rev.1259, 1309 (1993).
157
64.04.130 Wash. Rev. Code.
158
See, e.g., Richardson v. Cox, 108 Wash.App 881, 884, 890-91, 26 P.3d 970 (2001); Nollan,
483 U.S. at 833 n.2; id. at 859 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dedication achieved via a deed restriction).
159
Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[T]here is
little doubt that the preservation of the habitat of an endangered species is for government and third
party use—the public—which serves a public purpose.”); see also Nw. Louisiana Fish & Game Pres.
Comm’n v. United States, 446 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (a taking may occur when government policies cause vegetation overgrowth that interferes with property rights).
160
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 393-94.
161
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592.
162
KAPO, 160 Wash.App at 273 (“Regulations adopted under the GMA that impose conditions
on development applications must comply with the nexus and rough proportionality tests.”); HEAL,
96 Wash.App 522, 533 (“[P]olicies and regulations adopted under GMA must comply with nexus and
rough proportionality limits the United States Supreme Court has placed on governmental authority to
impose conditions on development applications.”); see also Dunlap v. City of Nooksack, 158
Wash.App 1016 (2010) (not reported) (holding that application of a critical area buffer to preclude
reasonable development of a residential zoned lot effected a total regulatory taking requiring payment
of just compensation).
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V. LINGLE AND KOONTZ DEMAND THAT WASHINGTON’S SUPREME
COURT RECOGNIZE THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
AND REFORM ITS BODY OF REGULATORY TAKINGS CASE LAW
Over the years, the Washington Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court interpreting the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution “set[] a minimum floor of protection,
below which state law may not go.”163 Yet, the Washington State Supreme
Court has failed to act when faced with a series of appellate decisions
adopting rules that directly conflict with Nollan, Dolan, Lingle, and
Koontz (not to mention conflicts with past state precedents). As it currently
stands, the State’s law of unconstitutional conditions is marred by a significant split of authority in regard to two important questions: (1) whether
legislatively-mandated exactions are subject to the doctrine; and (2) what
is the proper standard of review?
A. There Is No Meaningful Distinction Between A Permit Condition Imposed Pursuant to Legislative Direction and One Imposed in an Adjudicative Proceeding
Prior to CSA, Washington courts had uniformly held legislatively
mandated exactions of real property subject to Nollan and Dolan.164 Without acknowledging that large body of case law, the CSA court concluded
that legislative exactions are exempt from heightened scrutiny based
solely on Justice Kagan’s dissent in Koontz and a passage from Del Monte
Dunes, reading:
We have not extended the rough-proportionality test of Dolan beyond
the special context of exactions—land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication of property to public use.165

In reaching that conclusion, however, the CSA Court failed to
acknowledge that at least four other appellate decisions had rejected CSA’s
conclusion, concluding that the particular passage from Del Monte Dunes
was dicta and intended only to summarize the posture of past decisions
(which had involved adjudicative land-use decisions).166
163

Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash.2d 621, 652, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987).
See, e.g., KAPO, 160 Wash.App at 273 (“Regulations adopted under the GMA that impose
conditions on development applications must comply with the nexus and rough proportionality
tests.”); HEAL, 96 Wash.App at 533 (“[P]olicies and regulations adopted under GMA must comply
with nexus and rough proportionality limits the United States Supreme Court has placed on governmental authority to impose conditions on development applications”).
165
Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 702.
166
See, e.g., HEAL, 96 Wash.App at 534 (rejected supposed limitation as non-binding dicta);
Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 103 Wash.App 721, 723-28 (2000) (rejected because
Supreme Court has in fact extended exactions beyond the definition in Del Monte Dunes); affirmed
164
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There is simply no basis in the U.S. Supreme Court’s unconstitutional
conditions case law to conclude that conditions imposed pursuant to an act
of generally applicable legislation are exempt from the nexus and proportionality requirements. Indeed, in practice, it is often hard to differentiate
one from the other. 167 Although courts like CSA frequently state that Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz involved only conditions imposed as part of an
adjudicative process, that conclusion is incorrect. All three U.S. Supreme
Court cases involved conditions mandated by general legislation—a fact
specifically noted in each of the opinions. The dedication of the Nollans’
beachfront, for example, was required by a state law requiring that coastal
property owners provide public access to the beach as a condition on all
new development permits.168 Both the bike path and greenway dedications
at issue in Dolan were mandated by the city’s community planning
code.169 And the in-lieu fee at issue in Koontz was required by a state statute demanding that owners of land within designated areas dedicate land
or money to offset presumed impacts to wetlands and their buffers.170
Indeed, Koontz is illustrative of the interplay between the legislature
and the permitting desk.171 Acting pursuant to state water protection laws,
and nearly a decade before Koontz submitted his permit applications, Florida’s Department of Environmental Protection adopted regulations that
placed mandatory conditions on any property owner seeking to develop
land within designated wetland areas.172 The regulations required all local
permitting authorities to determine the size of the required dedication of

on other grounds, 146 Wash.2d 685 (2002); Isla Verde, 146 Wash.2d at 757-58; Isla Verde, 99
Wash.App at 138.
167
Steven A. Haskins, Closing the Dolan Deal—Bridging the Legislative/Adjudicative Divide,
38 Urb. Law. 487, 514 (2006) (describing the difficulty in drawing a line between legislative and
administrative decision making in the land-use context).
168
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828-30 (California Coastal Act and California Public Residential Code
imposed public access conditions on all coastal development permits); see also id. at 858 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (Pursuant to the California Coastal Act of 1972, a deed restriction granting the public
an easement for lateral beach access “had been imposed [by the Commission] since 1979 on all 43
shoreline new development projects in the Faria Family Beach Tract”).
169
See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 377-78 (The city’s development code “requires that new development
facilitate this plan by dedicating land for pedestrian pathways”); id. at 379-80 (“The City Planning
Commission . . . granted petitioner’s permit application subject to conditions imposed by the city’s
[Community Development Code]”).
170
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592 (Florida’s Water Resources Act of 1972 and Wetland Protection
Act of 1984 require that permitting agencies impose conditions on any development proposal within
designated wetlands).
171
Id. at 2592-93.
172
Id.
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land pursuant to a preset and generally-applicable mitigation ratio schedule.173 The condition at issue in Koontz was set by the district pursuant to
that schedule.174 The fact that the fee was legislatively required did not
deter the Court from concluding that it was subject to the nexus and proportionality tests175—a fact that compelled Justice Kagan, writing in dissent, to question whether the majority had rejected the legislative-versusadjudicative distinction.176
Whether or not Koontz rejected the legislative-versus-adjudicative
distinction is ultimately an irrelevant question because Nollan and Dolan
are rooted in the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, which “does not distinguish, in theory or in practice, between conditions imposed by different
branches of government.”177 The U.S. Supreme Court has frequently relied
on the doctrine to invalidate legislative acts that impose unconstitutional
conditions on individuals.178 Indeed, the very purpose of the doctrine—to
enforce a constitutional limit on government authority—explains why it
applies without regard to the type of government entity making the unconstitutional demand: it constrains the state itself, not a subordinate branch
thereof.
[T]he power of the state [ . . . ] is not unlimited; and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender
of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, compel
Id.; see also Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 5 n.4, Koontz, 133 S.Ct. 2586 (2012) (No.
11–1447), 2012 WL 3142655, at *5 n.4 (citing Fla. Dep't of Env. Reg., Policy for "Wetlands Preservation-as-Mitigation" (June 20, 1988)).
174
Brief for Respondent at 11-12, Koontz, 133 S.Ct. 2586 (2012) (No. 11–1447), 2012 WL
6694053.
175
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599-2600.
176
Id. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Levin v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 71 F. Supp.
3d 1072, 1083, n.4 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (concluding that Koontz undermines the reasoning for holding
legislative exactions exempt from scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan).
177
Burling & Owen, 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J. at, 400.
178
See Lafayette Ins. Co v. French, 59 U.S. 404, 407, (1855) (Invalidating provisions of state
law conditioning permission for a foreign company to do business in Ohio upon the waiver of the right
to litigate disputes in the U.S. Federal District Courts because “This consent [to do business as a foreign corporation] may be accompanied by such condition as Ohio may think fit to impose; . . . provided
they are not repugnant to the constitution of laws of the United States.”); see also Marshall v. Barlow’s
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978) (invalidating provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
holding that a business owner could not be compelled to choose between a warrantless search of his
business by a government agent or shutting down the business); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 255 (1974) (holding a state statute unconstitutional as an abridgement of freedom of the
press because it forced a newspaper to incur additional costs by adding more material to an issue or
remove material it desired to print); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (provisions of unemployment compensation statute held unconstitutional where government required person to “violate
a cardinal principle of her religious faith” in order to receive benefits); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 528-29 (1958) (a state constitutional provision authorizing the government to deny a tax exemption for applicants’ refusal to take loyalty oath violated unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
173
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a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guarantees embedded in
the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of
existence.179

“Giving greater leeway to conditions imposed by the legislative
branch is inconsistent with the theoretical justifications for the doctrine
because those justifications are concerned with questions of the exercise
[of] government power and not the specific source of that power.”180 A
property owner, after all, suffers the same injury whether a legislative or
administrative body forces him to bargain away his rights in exchange for
a land-use permit. There is “little doctrinal basis beyond blind deference
to legislative decisions to limit [the] application of [Nollan or Dolan] only
to administrative or quasi-judicial acts of government regulators.”181
Although Justice Kagan noted uncertainty regarding this question,
two Justices have expressed marked skepticism at the very idea that the
need for heightened scrutiny is obviated when a legislative body—as opposed to some other government entity—decides to exact a property interest from developers. In Parking Ass’n of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,
Ga., the Atlanta City Council, motivated by a desire to beautify the downtown area, adopted an ordinance that required the owners of parking lots
to include landscaped areas equal to at least 10% of the paved area at an
estimated cost of $12,500 per lot.182 Despite an apparent lack of proportionality, Georgia’s Supreme Court upheld the ordinance, concluding that
legislatively-imposed exactions are not subject to Nollan and Dolan.183
The dissenting justices stated that there appeared to be no meaningful distinction between legislatively-imposed conditions and other exactions.184
179
Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926) (invalidating
state law that required trucking company to dedicate personal property to public uses as a condition
for permission to use highways). See also Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 543 (1876)
(Bradley, J., dissenting) (“Though a State may have the power, if it sees fit to subject its citizens to
the inconvenience, of prohibiting all foreign corporations from transacting business within its jurisdiction, it has no power to impose unconstitutional conditions upon their doing so.”); Richard A.
Epstein, Bargaining with the State 5 (1993) (The doctrine holds that even if the government has absolute discretion to grant or deny any individual a privilege or benefit—such as a land-use permit, “it
cannot grant the privilege subject to conditions that improperly ‘coerce,’ ‘pressure,’ or ‘induce’ the
waiver of that person’s constitutional rights”).
180
Burling at 438.
181
David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspectives on Property
Rights Have Changed from Penn Central to Dolan, and What State and Federal Courts Are Doing
About It, 28 Stetson L. Rev. 523, 567-68 (1999).
182
515 U.S. 1116, 1116 (1995) (Thomas, J., joined by O’Connor, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
183
Id. at 1117.
184
Id. at 1117-18 (“It is not clear why the existence of a taking should turn on the type of government entity responsible for the taking. A city council can take property just as well as a planning
commission can”).
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Both justices argued that the question warrants review because it
raises a substantial question of federal constitutional law.185
Justice Thomas reaffirmed that position in his concurring opinion in
support of the Court’s denial of certiorari in California Bldg. Indus. Ass’n
v. City of San Jose.186 There, he wrote that the “lower courts have divided
over whether the Nollan/Dolan test applies in cases where the alleged taking arises from a legislatively imposed condition rather than an administrative one” for at least two decades.187 Once again, he expressed “doubt
that ‘the existence of a taking should turn on the type of governmental
entity responsible for the taking.’”188 Justice Thomas further noted that this
issue must be decided “at the earliest practicable opportunity.”189 Until
then, “property owners and local governments are left uncertain about
what legal standard governs legislative ordinances and whether cities can
legislatively impose exactions that would not pass muster if done administratively.” These factors present compelling reasons for resolving this
conflict at the earliest practicable opportunity.190 Those same policy concerns demand a resolution to this patent conflict in Washington’s unconstitutional conditions case law.
B. Only Heightened Scrutiny Enshrined in the Nexus and Proportionality
Tests Will Protect Both the Government’s Authority to Require Permit
Applicants to Mitigate for Negative Externalities and the Owners’ Property Rights
The heightened scrutiny required by Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz is
essential to the integrity of the permitting process. Typically, a permit decision will include conditions designed to minimize and/or mitigate adverse impacts caused by a new development. If limited to the impacts of
the proposed development, those conditions are likely within the government’s land use authority, which includes the power to direct development
in a manner that promotes communities and avoids nuisance or waste.191
But government officials by their very nature are politically motivated and,
if allowed unrestricted land use authority, will use the permit process to

185

Id. at 1118.
136 S. Ct. 928, 928 (2016) (Thomas, J. concurring in denial of certiorari).
187
Id. at 929.
188
Id. (citing Parking Ass’n of Georgia, 515 U.S. at 1117-18).
189
Id.
190
Id.; see also Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (The fact that this Court has
not yet resolved the split of authority on this question “casts a cloud on every decision by every local
government to require a person seeking a permit to pay or spend money”).
191
See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136-37 (1894).
186
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advance policies that may be unrelated to the proposed development.192 In
this regard, Professor Mark W. Cordes notes that Nollan and Dolan were
intended to curtail “the common municipal practice of using the development exaction process as a means to capture already targeted tracts of land
without paying just compensation[.]”193
The test created by KAPO, OSF, and CSA cannot distinguish an improper, politically-motivated permit condition from a proper condition
seeking to mitigate or minimize a harmful externality. Those decisions focus solely on whether the development condition is “reasonably necessary
to achieve a legitimate government objective.”194 When the test is formulated that way, the government’s ability to demand land for politicallymotivated purposes is only limited by an official’s imagination. So, it was
not surprising that in the three decisions applying that standard, the courts
upheld a condition that required owners to dedicate a predetermined
amount of waterfront property as a conservation buffer based solely on the
government’s argument that converting residential lots to nature preserves
would advance its environmental restoration and enhancement goals.195 In
none of the cases was the county required to show that the dedication of a
conservation area was in any way necessary to minimize or mitigate for
impacts caused by a proposed use of the burdened lots.196
Because the KAPO court based its decisions on the wrong constitutional provision, the due process rather than the takings clause, it is unsurprising that the rule focuses on a substantively different question than that
answered by Nollan and Dolan. KAPO, OSF, and CSA ask only whether
the government relied on a scientific document to determine “the necessity
of protecting functions and values in the critical areas,” i.e., the alleged
public need.197 By contrast, the Nollan and Dolan tests require that governments justify an exaction by demonstrating a sufficient relationship between the development condition and the impact caused by the proposed
development.198 In this regard, Koontz clarified that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine “does not implicate normative considerations about

192

Stuart Meck & Rebecca Retzlaff, The Zoning Hearing Examiner and Its Use in Idaho Cities
and Counties: Improving the Efficiency of the Land Use Permitting Process, 43 Idaho L. Rev. 409,
410-11, 442-43 (2007).
193
Mark W. Cordes, Legal Limits on Development Exactions: Responding to Nollan and Dolan,
15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 513, 551 (1995).
194
See KAPO, 160 Wn. App. 250 at 272-274.
195
KAPO, 160 Wash.App at 272-74; OSF, 166 Wash.App at 199; CSA, 189 Wash.App 1026, *5,
*7-8.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546-47.
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the wisdom of government decisions,” nor does it posit whether the exaction is “arbitrary or unfair.”199 Instead, the court’s task is to determine
whether a permit condition bears the “required degree of connection between the exactions imposed by the [government] and the projected impacts” of the property owner’s proposed change in land use.200
The U.S. Supreme Court explained this important distinction in
Lingle, when it rejected the “substantially advances a legitimate government interest” test as a takings test, because it “reveal[ed] nothing about
the magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation imposes
upon private property rights.”201 “A test that tells us nothing about the actual burden imposed on property rights, or how that burden is allocated,
cannot tell us when justice might require that the burden be spread among
taxpayers through payment of compensation.”202 In the context of the takings clause, a determination that a regulation serves a public need, without
more, is not sufficient to justify a regulation that appropriates property for
a public use.203
Because the Washington rule cannot distinguish legitimate conditions from illegitimate demands, the rule threatens to undermine the anticoercion underpinnings of the nexus and proportionality tests.204 By designating public need as the sole determinative factor when an exaction is
challenged, the Washington rule endorses the very type of opportunistic
taking of property that the U.S. Supreme Court expressly disallowed in
Nollan and Dolan. In Dolan, the Court explained that nexus and proportionality analysis is necessary to determine whether a development condition is “‘merely being used as an excuse for taking property simply because at that particular moment the landowner is asking the city for some
license or permit.’”205 Without meaningful scrutiny, it is impossible for a
court to determine whether there is a sufficient relationship between the
exaction and the development impact, making it possible that the demand
“would be fortuitous, since the type and extent of the exaction is determined by the preexisting determination of the plan rather than the impact

199

Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600.
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 377.
201
544 U.S. at 542.
202
Id. at 543.
203
Id. at 542-43; see also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (“[A]
strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving that desire by
a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change”).
204
See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594 (The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions “vindicates the
Constitution’s enumerated rights by preventing the government from coercing people into giving them
up”).
205
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390 (quoting Simpson v. City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb.
1980)).
200
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of the development.”206 Thus, the analysis required by Nollan and Dolan
is especially important where the government seeks to exact benefits relating to popular policy goals, such as environmentalism.207
C. The Ordinary Deference Given to General Legislative Acts Cannot
Protect Against Unconstitutional Conditions and Cannot Replace the
Heightened Scrutiny Required by Nollan and Dolan
The most common argument in favor of excluding legislative demands for money and/or property from Nollan and Dolan—deference to
the Legislature208—demonstrates precisely why heightened scrutiny is
necessary. Typically, when reviewing a challenge to an act of legislation,
courts will defer to the will of the people because generally-applicable
laws are subject to the democratic process, which operates as a check on
legislative authority.209 However, that justification fails in the context of
exactions, because the Takings Clause is founded on the anti-majoritarian
principle that “public burdens ... should be borne by the public as a whole”
and cannot be shifted onto individual property owners.210 When the government places public costs on a small number of people, the democratic
process, which is majoritarian in nature, works as an endorsement, not a
check.211 In that circumstance, “it [is] entirely possible that the government
could ‘gang up’ on particular groups to force extractions that a majority of
constituents would not only tolerate, but applaud, so long as burdens they
would otherwise bear were shifted to others.”212
That is precisely what occurred in each of the state cases where the
courts refused to subject buffer exactions to heightened scrutiny. In KAPO,
the court upheld a dedication of a 100-foot conservation buffer where the
county admitted in the record that the mandatory dedication was not related to any identified impacts of shoreline development—instead, the
county wanted to impose buffers that were larger than necessary to pre-
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serve private shorelines until such a time as the county could do the necessary studies to learn what impacts could occur if the land was developed.213
Similarly, in CSA, San Juan County decided to address its general
water quality concerns by adopting an ordinance requiring individual landowners to dedicate buffers designed to filter pollutants from area runoff.214
The County did this despite the fact that itsstudies had concluded that a
significant amount of the pollutants originate from upland properties, including runoff from public roads.215 There is no question that the County
could have implemented its policy by condemning land or existing buildings for a public use.216 Instead, the County made its demand in the form
of a permit condition, circumventing the just compensation requirement.
These cases demonstrate that, without a requirement that the government prove a sufficient connection between a legislative exaction and the
project impacts, there is no limit to the amount of money or property that
the government can demand as a permit condition, and there is no end to
the types of social problems that the government can burden an individual
permit applicant with. In this regard, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that “[i]f . . . the uses of private property were subject to
unbridled, uncompensated qualification under the police power, the ‘natural tendency of human nature [would be] to extend the qualification more
and more until at last private property disappeared.’”217 Thus, a rule requiring only that the government show that a buffer will advance its interest in protecting the environment cannot address the protections guaranteed by the Takings Clause and cannot supplant the wisdom and balance
written into the nexus and proportionality tests.
VI. CONCLUSION
Washington’s current rule encourages the very type of government abuse of the permitting process that Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz intended to stop. In its current state, Washington case law violates two of the
most basic principles of takings law. First, that “a strong public desire to
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improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving that desire
by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.” 218
Second, that “public burdens ... should be borne by the public as a whole”
and cannot be shifted onto individual property owners.219 Resolution of
this constitutional conflict is a matter of utmost importance to private and
public interests, which both rely on predictability in the law in order to
plan for future development. It is also a matter of extreme importance to
environmental interests because local governments are myopically relying
on private buffer dedications as the primary tool to mitigate for development impacts, thereby exposing the government to significant liability
should the legal tactic fail.
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